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Abstract
Consider a two player game that is to be played once. The players receive
information that they use to help them predict the choices made by each
other. A decision rule for each player captures how each player uses the
information received in making their choices. Priors in this context are
probability distributions over the information that may be received and over
the decision rules that their opponents may use. I investigate the existence
of prior beliefs for each player that satisfy the following properties: (R) they
do not rule out their opponent using a rational decision rule, (K) they do
not rule out the existence of information that that would reveal the choice
made by the opponent, and (SU) they do not rule out strategic uncertainty
 a belief diversity condition. In this paper I show that for a large class of
games there are no prior beliefs that satisfy properties (R), (K) and (SU). In
the paper I discuss the implications of this result, in particular regarding
whether one should expect a Nash equilibrium to arise in a game that is to
be played once.
1 Introduction
Imagine that two individuals enter a room and are given information about
a game they are about to play with each other, once. The purpose of this
paper is to provide an answer to the following question: can we expect these
players to play a Nash equilibrium of the game?
It is di¢ cult to overstate the importance of this question as Nash equilib-
rium is the central solution concept used at making predictions about what
will transpire in a non-cooperative game that is played once. It may su¢ ce
here to recall Myersons (1999) initial words in his article on Nash equilibrium
and the history of economic theory: The formulation of Nash equilibrium
has had a fundamental and pervasive impact in economics and the social sci-
ences which is comparable to that of the discovery of the DNA double helix
in the biological sciences.(p. 1067)
Many applications of game theory assume players will play a Nash equi-
librium of a non-cooperative game even if the game is only going to be played
once. However, there is substantial experimental evidence that in such situ-
ations play deviates systematically from equilibrium. This has been promi-
nently exemplied in the work by Nagel (1995), Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt
(1998), Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta
(1998, 2001), Costa-Gomes and Weizasäcker (2005), Camerer, Ho and Chong
(2004) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006).
In general, the experimental literature appeals to some form of bounded
rationality to explain these ndings. In this paper I put bounded rationality
considerations aside and explore whether there is a conceptual barrier as
to why play systematically deviates from equilibrium in one shot games.
In other words, whereas the experimental evidence shows that conditions
that lead to Nash equilibrium are di¢ cult to satisfy in practice, I ask in
the present paper whether the conditions that lead to equilibrium can even
obtain in principle. An a¢ rmative answer to this question would allow us to
see the experimental evidence in a new light, as it would show that the results
that have been obtained in the experiments are natural and to be expected,
given the intrinsic di¢ culties players have in reasoning their way to a Nash
equilibrium, rather than pathological and susceptible to go away if one only
found the right experimental treatment in which to examine Nashs theory.
From a conceptual standpoint, the state of the art regarding conditions
that lead to Nash equilibrium is developed in the seminal paper by Aumann
and Brandenburger (1995), which identied conditions about what the play-
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ers must know and believe about each other for the actions chosen by the
players or the beliefs held by them to be a Nash equilibrium. In their Pre-
liminary Observation they notice that rationality plus mutual knowledge of
the action prole chosen by all players su¢ ces for that action prole to be
a Nash equilibrium. In addition, in their Theorem A (for two player games)
they show that mutual knowledge of rationality, mutual knowledge of the
structure of the game, and mutual knowledge of the conjectures the players
have about each others choices su¢ ces for those conjectures to be a Nash
equilibrium. Also, in their Theorem B (for n player games) they show that if
the players have a common prior, their payo¤ functions and their rationality
are mutually known, and that their conjectures are commonly known, then
for each player j, all the other players agree on the same conjecture about j,
and the resulting prole of conjectures is a Nash equilibrium.1
In this paper I show that there is indeed a conceptual barrier to inter-
preting the Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) results as providing support
for the notion that one should expect Nash equilibrium to arise in a one shot
play. This barrier stems from the fact that the conditions that lead to Nash
equilibrium in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) are di¢ cult to obtain if
they are not assumed at the outset. In this paper I develop a very simple
formalism to show that this is indeed the case.
An informal description of the setup in which I operate is as follows.
Imagine that two players are about to enter a room, or context, in which
they simultaneously receive some information m regarding a game that they
are about to play with each other. After this, each player independently
chooses an action from their action set.
A decision rule for any such player is a map from the information re-
vealed to the players to an action set. Therefore, before the players enter
the room they have beliefs about the decision rules chosen by their oppo-
nents and about the information m to be received. One could assume, as
as in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, that these beliefs are degenerate, that is,
that they are point mass on the actual decision rule chosen by the opponent.
Naturally, a degenerate prior rules out strategic uncertainty about how the
opponent will play conditional on the information that is received. I stay
away from this assumption, as this would beg the question as to how did
1For excellent surveys on these and other results on the epistemic foundations of game
theory see Bonanno and Battigalli (1999), Brandenburger (1999, 2006), Dekel and Gul
(1997) and Samuelson (2004).
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these beliefs congure themselves in equilibrium proportions to begin with.
In this paper I work with prior beliefs that are nondegenerate and hence not
concentrated on the actual decision rules chosen by each opponent. I label
these as priors that do not rule out strategic uncertainty.
I am therefore interested in investigating the existence of priors that do
not rule out strategic uncertainty that, conditional on the information that
is revealed at the context, would lead the playersknowledge and belief to
satisfy the Aumann and Brandenburger conditions for Nash equilibrium.
More specically, I wish to impose the following properties on these prior
beliefs:
(R). That they are consistent with rationality: Player 1 does not rule out
that 2 uses a rational decision rule. Similarly for player 2.
(K). That they can lead to mutual knowledge of actions: Player 1 does
not rule out that he may receive information that would reveal the choice
that player 2 makes. Similarly for player 2.
(SU) That they do not rule out strategic uncertainty: if player 1 does not
rule out a decision rule for player 2 then there is a simple variant of this
decision rule that is a decision rule for player 1, and that player 2 does not
rule out for player 1.
Loosely, the main result of the paper, Theorem 1, is that for a large class
of games there are no prior beliefs for players 1 and 2 that satisfy R, K and
SU.2
The interpretation of this result is as follows: mutual knowledge of ac-
tions cannot arise as a consequence of the players having access to some
common information about the game to be played in a setup where playerss
prior beliefs do not rule out strategic uncertainty, namely, when the players
are both equally cautious about how each other respond to the information
received. This poses a barrier to the interpretation of Aumann and Branden-
burgers Preliminary Observation as providing support for the notion that
players would play a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game that is to
be played just once.
It is quite fair to say that the real contributions in Aumann and Bran-
denburger (1995) are their Theorems A and B, which make no assumptions
about whether the action prole chosen by the players is mutual knowledge.
2Theorem 1 is actually stronger than this since it works with " rationality and mu-
tual p belief of action proles. I have ommited those details in this introduction to aid
exposition.
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Unfortunately it turns out that mutual knowledge of action proles is implied
by the assumptions in Theorems A and B for a large class of games, namely,
those with strict Nash equilibria. This is Theorem 5 in the present paper.
This means that for a large class of games the assumptions in Theorems A
and B cannot be satised if mutual knowledge of actions does not hold. In
light of Theorem 1, this poses a barrier to the interpretation of Aumann and
Brandenburgers Theorems A and B as providing support for the notion that
the playersconjectures would be a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative
game that is to be played just once.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 I develop
an example that illustrates the main issues and results. In Section 3 I develop
the model of a non-cooperative game in which I prove my results. In Section
4 I state and prove the main results. Finally, in Section 5, I discuss further
the interpretation of the results together with the related literature.
2 An Illustration
Consider the two player game G:
Bob
c d
Ann C 3; 3 0; 0
D 0; 0 1; 1
and a situation in which both players receive one of two pieces of information,
m1 or m2, before the game is played. Each player has beliefs about the
information that they will receive, and about what this information may say
about the action chosen by the opponent.
(i) Consider a case in which each player is certain that the opponent uses
constant decision rules, namely, rules that choose the same action regardless
of the information received. An example of what these beliefs would look
like is described in Context 1 below:
A: B:
cc cd dd dc CC CD DD DC
m1 49% 0 1% 0 m1 49% 0 1% 0
m2 1% 0 49% 0 m2 1% 0 49% 0
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Read the example as follows: A is Anns belief over the decision rules
of Bob and over the information the players may receive. A decision rule for
Bob captures how Bob chooses an action from his action set based on the
information received. For example, decision rule cd for Bob is one in which
he chooses c if he receives information m1 and chooses d if he receives in-
formation m2. The numbers inside the cells denote the ex ante probabilities
that the players ascribe to the information and the decision rule correspond-
ing to that cell. For example, according to A, Ann puts probability 1% on
receiving information m1 and on Bob using decision rule dd. Notice also that
Ann puts probability zero on Bob using rules cd and dc. Similar statements
can be made about Bobs prior belief B.
In this example Ann considers possible only two decision rules for Bob:
one according to which Bob plays c regardless of the information received
(decision rule cc), and one according to which Bob plays d regardless of the
information received (decision rule dd). Anns beliefs about Bobs choices
are also determined by A: when the information received by the players
is m1 Ann puts probability of 98% on Bob choosing c, whereas when the
information received by the players is m2 Ann puts probability of 2% on Bob
choosing c. Similar statements can be made regarding Bobs beliefs.
Notice that for every decision rule Ann considers possible for Bob there
is information that reveals with high probability the choice made by that
decision rule of Bob: for rule cc the information is m1, and for rule dd the
information ism2:3 Similarly for every decision rule Bob considers possible for
Ann. These beliefs therefore satisfy property K. Notice also that the beliefs
for both players are rather similar regarding the kinds of decision rules they
consider possible for each other. These beliefs satisfy property SU.4
The starting point of this paper is the observation that the support of each
players beliefs are inconsistent with rationality (therefore violating property
R). This is so because each player is certain that her opponent uses a de-
cision rule that is independent of the information received even though, if
3Anns belief over c conditional on m1 is 98% and Bob in fact chooses action c when
using decision rule cc and receives information m1. In turn, Anns belief over d conditional
on m2 is 98% and Bob in fact chooses action d when using decision rule dd and receives
information m2.
4This is, of course, an informal statement. The example exactly satises properties SU
and K, as these properties are dened in Section 3 of the paper.
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players actually use rational decision rules, their decision rules will not be
independent of the information received: given these beliefs, a rational de-
cision rule for Ann would choose C if the information received is m1 and D
if the information received is m2 (decision rule CD); similarly for Bob and
rule cd.
The situation is complicated if both players use rational decision rules and
somehow the structure of the game and the belief structure is known to both
players for then Ann, correctly knowing Bobs payo¤s, and also knowing that
Bob puts positive probability only on the constant rules for Ann, would be
certain, and wrong, that Bob does not use a rational decision rule in making
his choice. Similarly for Bob.
(ii) One could try to remedy this situation by adding to the supports of
the players beliefs the decision rules that vary with the information received.
Then, for this game, beliefs would not rule out strategic uncertainty (would
satisfy SU) and would be consistent with rationality (they would satisfy R)
but then they could not lead to mutual knowledge of actions (they would
violate K). To see this assume that the beliefs are now given by Context 2
below:
A: B:
cc cd dd dc CC CD DD DC
m1 24% 24% 1% 1% m1 24% 24% 1% 1%
m2 1% 24% 24% 1% m2 1% 24% 24% 1%
Now Anns beliefs, conditional on m1 are that with probability 96% Bob
chooses c. Conditional on m2, Ann believes that Bob chooses c with proba-
bility 4%.
Clearly, the beliefs do not rule out strategic uncertainty and include a
rational decision rule for each player in their supports (hence satisfying SU
and R).
Now lets check whether K holds, that is, whether for every decision rule
Ann considers possible for Bob there is information that reveals with high
probability the choice made by that decision rule of Bob: for rule cc the
information is m1, for rule dd the information is m2, and for rule cd either
piece of information, m1 or m2, works. Now notice that for rule dc there
is no information that would reveal with high probability the choice made
by that decision rule of Bob, since if the information is m1 rule dc picks d
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and Ann believes with probability 96% that Bob chooses c: In turn, if the
information is m2 rule dc picks c and Ann believes with probability 96% that
Bob chooses d.
(iii) One could, again, try to remedy this situation by adding more pieces
of information to the information space (e.g, information that would iden-
tify dc). But as one includes more information the set of decision rules for
each player also changes, therefore making the rational decision rule more
complicated. For example, imagine now that there are now three pieces of
information, m1, m2 and m3, (where m3 is a copyof m2 in that players are
certain that each other chooses at m3 as they did at m2) and that the beliefs
are as in Context 3 below
A: B:
ccc cdd ddd dcc CCC CDD DDD DCC
m1 23% 23% 1% 1% m1 23% 23% 1% 1%
m2 1% 23% 23% 1% m2 1% 23% 23% 1%
m3 2% 0 0 2% m3 2% 0 0 2%
Again, in this case, it is not hard to see that the beliefs have supports
that are structurally similar, therefore satisfying SU. It is also the case that
for every decision rule Ann considers possible for Bob there is information
that reveals, with high probability, the choice made by Bob under that rule,
therefore satisfying K. To see this notice that for rule ccc the information is
m1, for rule ddd the information ism2, for rule cdd either piece of information,
m1 or m2, works, and for rule dcc, the information is m3. Yet, again, in this
example, R fails: given these beliefs, Bobs rational decision rule is cdc, which
Ann has ruled out for Bob in this case. Then, if players are rational, beliefs
over decision rules will be mis-specied.
(iv) One could, once more, try to remedy this situation by altering the
beliefs in some other way. The main message of this paper is that there is
no remedy to this situation: there are no beliefs for this game for which R, K
and SU simultaneously hold.
Theorem 1 in the present paper shows that the inconsistency between R,
K and SU that these examples display is not specic to the particular game
being considered in this Section but that it indeed holds for a very large class
of games, namely, for those games without a weakly dominant action for each
player.
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3 The setup
3.1 The context of a non-cooperative game
I consider standard nite two player5 games G = hA1; A2; g1; g2i : I dene C =
hM;1; 2i ; a context for game G; as a nite information spaceM and a prior
belief i for each player i. The interpretation is that rst the players receive
some common information (information m; from the information space M)
and then simultaneously make their action choices.
Throughout the paper I remain agnostic as to the content of this infor-
mation. It is not payo¤ relevant but it may, or may not, contain information
about the opponents payo¤s, actions, or beliefs.
GivenM one can dene a decision rule for player i as a map ri :M ! Ai:
Any such decision rule encodes how the information revealed will a¤ect the
choices made by each player. Let Ri be the set of decision rules for player i.
Players do not know which decision rule their opponents are employing
for the purpose of making their choice of action. Instead they have beliefs
over which rule it may be. Hence, player is prior belief i is a probability
distribution over the set R iM: Let Rb i be the support of player is belief   
i over R i; let Rb = Rb1 Rb2 and let ai (;m) be the belief over A   i held by
player i that is induced by the conditional distribution i ( jm). Therefore,
xing C not only determines M and i but also R and ai .
I am interested in whether a context C exists that satises certain natural
properties. I want the context to be consistent
b
with rationality, to permit
mutual knowledge of actions and not to rule out strategic uncertainty. Formal
denitions of these properties follow.
3.2 The rationality of a context
Fix "  0: Given 1 and g1, rule r1 in R1 is an " rational decision rule for
player 1 if, for every m 2M :X
a1 (a2;m) g1 (r1(m); a 
a
2) + " 
X
1 (a2;m) g1 (a1; a2) for all a1
a22A2 a22A2
2 A1
5I focus on two player games, but I see no di¢ culty in extending the result to games
with more than two players.
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Similarly for player 2.
Context C is consistent with " rationality if for each player i there is at
least one decision rule ri in Ri that is an " rational decision rule for player
i. If this holds I say that the context satises property R. The interpretation
is that each player does not
b
rule out the opponent using a rational decision
rule. It is a very weak assumption.
3.3 Contexts that can lead to mutual knowledgeof
actions
Fix p 2 (0; 1] : Context C can lead to mutual p belief of actions if for every
r2 2 Rb2 there is some information m 2M such that
a1 (r2 (m) ;m)  p;
and similarly with the roles of the players reversed. If this holds I say that
the context satises property K.
The interpretation is as follows. Assume for a moment that player 1 picks
his decision rule from among those that player 2 has not ruled out for him.
Property K requires that there is a piece of information m that, were player 2
to receive it, it would reveal (with high probability) the actual action chosen
by player 1 according to this information and his chosen rule.
To actually see how weak condition K is assume that a pair of players are
about to play game G in context C: Assume that for the purpose of deriving
their choice in G player 1 uses rule r1 and player 2 uses rule r2. Assume
that the players receive information m 2 M . Even if this context satises
property K this has no implications whatever on the beliefs each player has,
conditional on m, over each others choices. All it says is that there must
have been some information m0 and m00; not necessarily the same for each
player, that the players could have received that would have led the players
to assign high probability to the actual actions chosen by each other when
their opponents also received such information m0 and m00:
It is also instructive to consider a stronger version of K, dubbed K, where,
for each strategy prole in the support of the players beliefs, the information
that reveals the players choices is the same across players. Fix p 2 (0; 1] :
Context satises property K if for any (r1; r2) R there is informationC 2 b
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m 2M such that
a1 (r2 (m) ;m)
a
 p and
2 (r1 (m) ;m)  p:
The main result in the present paper uses the weaker property K. Property
K plays a role in Section 5, where I compare my results with those of Aumann
and Brandenburger (1995).
3.4 Strategic Uncertainty
Let 12 : A1 ! A2 be a function that translatesactions from the action
space of player 1 to the action space of player 2.
Rule r2 for player 2 is a mechanical brother of rule r1 if there is a trans-
lation 12 such that
r2 (m) = 12 (r1 (m)) for every m 2M .
Similarly for player 1.
Context C does not rule out strategic uncertainty if every mechanical
brother r2 of r1 2 R1 is in R2; similarly for player 1. If this holds I say that
the context satise
b
s propert
b
y SU.
The intention behind requiring that beliefs do not rule out strategic un-
certainty is to ensure that beliefs have support that are su¢ ciently diverse (in
particular, that they are not concentrated around the actual decision rules
being employed by the players). I make this assumption because it makes
little sense to investigate how is it that actions can become mutual knowledge
in a setup in which the decision rules are mutual knowledge themselves. One
would then have to explain how this came to be the case. In other words,
I do not wish to impose equilibrium-like restrictions on the beliefs over de-
cision rules as I try to explain how equilibrium in actions (or in beliefs over
actions) arises as a result of deliberation and conditioning on the information
that may be received about a game to be played in a static setting.
Remark 1 It is important to keep in mind that beliefs do not have to have
full support on the entire set of decision rules of the opponent to satisfy SU.
For example, the beliefs in Contexts 1 and 3 in Section 2 are not full support
on the set of decision rules, yet they satisfy SU.
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The discussion above reveals that assuming R, K or SU in isolation is not
very restrictive. The situation is very di¤erent if one wishes to assume them
jointly.
4 The results
An action a1 is weakly dominant if, for any a2 2 A2;
g1 (a

1; a2)  max g1 (a1; a2) :
a12A1
The denition for player 2 is similar.
Game G satises No Weak Dominance (NWD) if neither player has a
weakly dominant action.
The main result of the paper is the following:
Theorem 1 Suppose that NWD holds in game G. Then there is " > 0 and
p 2 (0; 1] such that, for any " 2 [0; ") and any p 2 (p; 1] there is no context
C for G that satises R, K and SU.
The interpretation is that, for a large set of games, if beliefs do not rule
out strategic uncertainty and can lead to mutual p belief of actions then
they are inconsistent with the opponent employing an " rational decision
rule. Then, to the extent that players employ a rational decision rule when
facing game G and context C, then the players beliefs over decision rules will
necessarily be mis-specied.
Remark 2 The result breaks down for games with a weakly dominant action
for each player because beliefs that do not rule out strategic uncertainty would
always be consistent with rationality as R would contain the decision rule for
each player that always chooses the weak
b
ly dominant action for that player.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the notion of an evil twin, which I dene
below.
4.1 Evil twins
As in Nachbar (1997, 2005) dene the function a2 : A1 ! A2 for any action
a1 2 A1 by
a2 (a1) 2 arg max max g (a0 ; a )
e
1
a22A2

1 2
a0 2A1 1
  g1 (a1; a2)

:e
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Loosely, when player 2 chooses a2 (a1) player 1 has maximal incentives
not to choose a1:
Rule r2 2 R2 is an evil twin of r
e
1 2 R1 if
r2 (m) = a2 (r1 (m)) for every m 2M
A similar denition holds for player 2.
Context C has the evil twi
e
n property if for any decision rule r1 2 Rb 1 thereis a decision rule r2 2 R2 that is an evil twin of r1:
A decision rule r1 cannot be rational for player 1 if there is som
b
e infor-
mation m that would lead player 1 to know the choice made by player 2 and
player 2s decision rule is an evil twin of r1. The following lemma, adapted
from a result by Nachbar (1997) on Bayesian learning, records this fact. The
proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 Suppose that NWD holds in game G. Then there is " > 0 and
p 2 (0; 1] such that, for any " 2 [0; ") and p 2 (p; 1]; and any context C of G,
and any r1 2 R1; if r2 is an evil twin of r1 and a1 (r2 (m) ;m)  p for some
m 2M then r1 is no
e
t an " rational decision rule fo
e
r player 1. Similarly for
player 2.
The next step in the argument is to observe that evil twins of the sort
constructed above will be included in the support of priors that satisfy SU.
Lemma 3 Let G be a nite two player game and C be a context for G. If C
satises SU then it also satises the evil twin property.
Proof. Pick any r1 2 R1: Dene 12 : A1 ! A2 by 12 (a1) = a2 (a1) : It
then follows from condit
b
ion SU that R2 contains an evil twin of r1
e
and that
C satises the evil twin property.
I am now in a position to prove th
b
e papers main result.
4.2 The proof of Theorem 1
Fix " and p as in Lemma 2. Pick " < " and p 2 (p; 1]: Assume there is a
context C for G that satises K and SU. I will show that C violates R.
Pick any r1 2 R1: Since C satises SU, Lemma 3 implies that there is
r2 2 R2 that is an evil twin of r1. By property K, there is m 2M such that
be b
12
a1 (r2 (m) ;m)  p: Then, by Lemma 2, r1 is not an " rational decision rule
for p
e
layer 1. Since r1 was arbitrary it follows that C is not consistent with
" rationality. A similar argument can be built starting with any r2 2 R2: 
For the interpretation of this result see the Introduction and Sectio
b
n 5.
4.3 Games with strict Nash equilibria
A strict Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which each player would
do worse if she were to deviate from the action prescribed to her by the Nash
equilibrium prole. Strict Nash equilibria arise, for example, when the best
response correspondences of the players are single valued. Many games of
interest have only strict Nash equilibria.
Let Gs = hN; (Ai) ; (gsi )i be an n player game with only strict Nash
equilibria. Let Gi be a set of payo¤ functions for player i and consider an
epistemic model such as the one developed in Auma
nn and Brandenburger
(2005). Such epistemic model is essentially the prole (Ti)i ;2N where Ti is a
set, each element of Ti is a probability distribution overA iG iT i and the
states of the world are members of S = 
i
A2N i T

Gi Ti: he interpretation
is that each state of the world species, for each player, the action chosen
by the player, the players payo¤ function, and the players beliefs over the
opponentsaction, payo¤ and belief.
It turns out that the following is true:
Proposition 4 Let  be an n-tuple of mixed strategies. Suppose that at some
state of the world s it is mutually known that the players are all rational, that
the game Gs is being played, that the conjecture of each player i about each
other player j is j; and that it is independent of is conjecture about all other
players. Then the action prole chosen by the players is mutually known at
s.
Proof. By Lemma 2.6 in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) it follows that
the players are indeed rational, that the game being played is actually Gs and
that the conjecture of each player i about each other player j is in fact j: By
Remark 7.1 in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)  is a Nash equilibrium
of Gs: By the denition of Gs;  is a strict Nash equilibrium, hence, for each
player j, j puts probability one on a single action aj. Each player i then
puts probability one on player j being rational, on js payo¤ being gsj ; and
on js conjecture about all other players being (a j) : Then player i puts
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probability one on j choosing the only action that maximizes gsj with respect
to (a j). By the denition of Gs, this action is equal to a e  j; which is inde d
the action that player j chooses at s.
The following result is a consequence of combining the content of Theo-
rems A and B in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) with Proposition 4.
Theorem 5 For games with only strict Nash equilibria the hypotheses in
Theorem A and Theorem B in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) about
what must be true at a certain state of the world s imply mutual knowledge
of the action prole chosen by the players at s.
Proof. First consider the hypotheses in Theorem A (two players) for game
Gs. These are: mutual knowledge of rationality, of conjectures, and of Gs.
Since there are only two players, independence is automatically satised and
Proposition 4 implies that the action prole chosen at s is mutual knowledge.
Next consider the hypotheses in Theorem B for game Gs. These are: a
common prior, mutual knowledge of the game being Gs and of the players
rationality, and that their conjectures are commonly known. Then Theorem
B implies that, for each player j, all the other players agree on the same
conjecture about j and the proof of Theorem B implies that these conjectures
are independent. Then Proposition 4 implies that the action prole chosen
at s is mutual knowledge.
This implies that that for games with only strict Nash equilibria the
assumptions in Theorems A and B cannot be satised in a context where
mutual knowledge of actions cannot be satised. More on this in the Section
below.
5 Discussion
5.1 Interpretation of the results
Let G be a game and let p and " be as in Theorem 1. In addition, let C be
a context for G that satises K and SU. Then, by Theorem 1, the supports of
the players beliefs i must not contain an " rational decision rule for either
player: The implication is that if both players employ rational decision rules
when facing game G and context C then beliefs over decision rules at C will
be misspecied as each player would be using a rule that necessarily would
be outside of the support of the opponents belief. Therefore, under the
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hypotheses of Theorem 1, the players can use rational decision rules or have
well-specied beliefs over decision rules, but not both. Under belief diversity,
if players use rational decision rules and have beliefs consistent with mutual
knowledge of actions, then the players will by necessity be wrong about each
others decision rules.
Actually, the situation is worse than this suggests. Let G be a game and
let p and " be as in Theorem 1. In addition, let C be a context for G that
satises K and SU. Assume that both players use " rational decision rules.
Suppose that player 1 somehow knows correctly that C satises K and SU and
that also correctly knows player 2s payo¤ function. It follows that player 1 is
certain (and wrong!) that player 2 is not using an " rational decision rule.
This is so because player 1, correctly knowing G and that C satises K and
SU, can use Theorem 1 to conclude that Rb2 does not contain any " rational
decision rule for player 2. By the denition of Rb2; this means that player 1 is
certain that player 2 is not using an " rational decision rule. Similarly for
player 2.
One is then left with a formalism populated by rational decision makers
that are certain that their opponents arent rational decision makers them-
selves! Not that one would want this, but this is precisely the point: it
is what would follow from the seemingly innocuous assumptions of rational
decision, mutual knowledge of payo¤s, and mutual knowledge of context C
satisfying K and SU.
5.2 Relation to Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)
The results presented here do not contradict in any way those of Aumann
and Brandenburger (1995). Needless to say, those results and their proofs
are correct as stated. Moreover, the assumptions behind the Preliminary
Observation, and Theorems A and B are not vacuous, as the discussion in
their Section 7.h shows. The point that I am trying to make in the present
paper is di¤erent: that those assumptions are di¢ cult to obtain if they are
not assumed at the outset.
Perhaps the best way to understand this, given a two player game G and
information spaceM is to consider an epistemic model forG whenG is viewed
a
s a gamewith a move by Nature,namely, to consider the epistemic model
TM1 ; T
M
2 where every element t
M
i 2 TMi is a probability distribution over
R i M  G i  TMi : In this setting, I dene an ex-ante state of the world     
as a member of W = R1 G1  TM1 R2 G2  TM2 and an interim state of
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the world as a member of S = W M:
The interpretation is that each ex ante state of the world species the
payo¤ functions for the players, what decision rule each player will use for
choosing an action after information m is revealed, and the players beliefs
over M and over each others rules, payo¤s and beliefs. An interim state
of the world, in addition, reveals such information m to the players and
therefore it also species the prole of actions chosen by the players at that
state. An interim state is essentially identical to a state in the conventional
epistemic model of Aumann and Brandenburger (1995).
Notice also that, given


TM1 E; M2 D T ; any ex ante state ! 2 W induces
a context C [!] [!][!] = M;1 ; 2 for the game [!] [!]G [!] = A1; A2; g1 ; g2 ;
where [!]i is dened to be player is belief over R iM a
D
t ! and [!]gi is t
E
he
payo¤ function for player i at !: I say that ex ante state ! 2 W satises R,
SU or K whenever C [!] ; respectively, satises R, SU or K for G [!] :
Let [!]ri be the decision rule that player i uses at ! 2 W and let Ri [!] be
the support of player is beliefs over at !: Rationality at ! for player i can
then be dened in a similar way, namely, when such [!]ri (m) is a best r
b
esponse
to a[!]i (;m) for allm 2M: Priors are well-specied at ! if [!]ri 2 Ri [!] for all
players. Rationality at an interim state s = (!;m) for player i si
to the action [!]ri (m) being a best response to
a[!]
i (;m) for the i
b
mply refers
nformation
m received by the players at s.
I say that priors can lead to Nash equilibrium at ! if priors at ! are
well-specied and satisfy K (for p = 1).
This denition makes sense because if the players are rational at ! and
the priors can lead to Nash equilibrium at ! this means that there is an
interim state s = (!;m) where both players are rational and have mutual
knowledge of action proles,6 hence making the actions chosen at s a Nash
equilibrium for the game being played. Moreover, if the game being played
at ! has only strict Nash equilibria and mutual knowledge of actions was
not possible at any state s = (!;m) then it follows from Theorem 5 that the
epistemic conditions for beliefs to be a Nash equilibrium from either Theorem
A or B in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) could not be satised at any
such s.
6To see this notice that, since priors at ! are well-specied then, by property K, there
is m 2M such that a [!]i r i (m) ;m = 1 for every player i.
 
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With this in place one can see what bearing Theorem 1 has on whether the
epistemic conditions that lead to Nash equilibrium can arise at some interim
state s = (!;m) that has priors that do not rule out strategic uncertainty at
!:
Theorem 6 Suppose that NWD holds in game G. Let ! 2 W be an ex-ante
state of the world of model


TM1 ; T
M
2 where G is being played. If players
are rational and their priors do not r

ule out strategic uncertainty at ! then
those priors cannot lead to Nash equilibrium at !.
Proof. Assume that there is an ex ante state ! such that priors can lead
to Nash equilibrium at !; that is, assume that priors at ! are well-specied
and satisfy K (and therefore K) for p = 1. Since the priors do not rule
out strategic uncertainty at ! then by denition they satisfy SU: Then, by
Theorem 1 the priors at ! do not satisfy R (for " = 0), that is, they rule out
the players being rational. Since, by assumption, the players are rational at
! then the priors must be mis-specied at !:The contradiction establishes
the result.
It is important to stress that Theorem 6 does not say that the Aumann
and Br
andenburger conditions cannot be satised in any interim state of
model TM M1 ; T2 . They can, but under CS and K this will happen as the
playersbeliefs are mis-specied about the decision rules of the opponent,
if the players use rational decision rules to begin with. The example below
shows how this is so.
Consider again the game G discussed in Section 2:
Bob
c d
Ann C 3; 3 0; 0
D 0; 0 1; 1
and the following context for G (Context 4):
A: cccc dddd B: CCCC DDDD
m1 25% 0 m1 25% 0
m2 0 25% m2 0 25%
m3 25% 0 m3 0 25%
m4 0 25% m4 25% 0
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This context is similar to Context 1 in Section 2 in that the players put
positive probability only on the constant decision rules for the opponent. It is
not hard to see that this context satises SU, as each player considers possible
all of the constant rules for the opponent. Context 4 also satises K since
for the prole (CCCC; cccc) information m1 reveals the choices made by
the players when they receive information m1, and similarly for the proles
(DDDD; dddd) ; (DDDD; cccc) ; and (CCCC; dddd; ) when the information
received by the players is, respectively, m2; m3, or m4. Now, given these
beliefs, Anns rational decision rule is CDCD and Bobs rational decision
rule is cddc: Because these rules are outside of the support of the beliefs of
the players, Context 4 violates R.
Now with these ingredients build an epistemic model TM1 ; T
M
2 for G
adapted to Context 4, namely, let TMA = fAg ; TMB = fB


g ; where

A and
B are as in Context 4 above. The interpretation is that in this example
there is only uncertainty about R and M ; not about TM or G. Consider
the interim state s = (CDDC; gA; A; cdcd; gB; B;m1) : It is not hard to
see that both players are rational at s, and that the action prole is mutual
knowledge at s. By Aumann and Brandenburgers Preliminary Observation,
the action prole chosen at s must be a Nash equilibrium. Such prole is
(C; c), indeed a Nash equilibrium of G.
It turns out that at this state s rationality (of actions), payo¤s and con-
jectures are mutual knowledge. Hence, by Theorem A in Aumann and Bran-
denburger, the conjectures the players have about each other must be a Nash
equilibrium. At state s Anns conjecture about Bob is that with probability
one Bob plays c; Bobs conjecture about Ann is that with probability one
Ann plays C. Those conjectures are indeed a Nash equilibrium of G. More-
over, G has only strict Nash equilibria, and these conjectures put probability
one on the prole (C; c), as Theorem 5 predicts.
It follows from the above discussion that s is a state of model TM ; TM1 2
where the Aumann and Brandenburger conditions for Nash equilibrium in
actions and in beliefs hold.Yet it is also true at s = (CDCD; gA;




A; cddc;
gB; B; m1) that beliefs over decision rules are mis-specied at s; as Theorem
1 predicts, and that players are certain, and wrong, that players do not use
a rational decision rule at s:
To sum it up: Theorem 6 does not say that the Aumann and Branden-
burger conditions cannot be satised in any interim state of model TM1 ; T
M
2 .
It does reveal, however, that for a large class of games, if priors


are to be
well-specied, so that rationality and K can lead to the Aumann and Bran

-
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denburgers conditions for Nash equilibrium in actions,7 then one would have
to rule out, ex ante, certain types of strategic uncertainty.
5.3 Similarities and di¤erences with Nachbar (1997,
2001, 2005)
As it is quite clear, the present paper owes much of its inspiration and
methodology to the work of Nachbar (1997, 2001, 2005) on repeated games.
The exercise I carry out in the present paper is not, however, a straightfor-
ward translation of his research into the language of interactive epistemology
and one shot games. There is much that does not translate directly, and
modelling choices had to be made throughout the entire exercise. Hence I
believe it is important to keep in proper perspective what the similarities
and the di¤erences are between Nachbars research and the present paper. I
explain those similarities and di¤erences below.
For the purpose of this discussion I mostly focus the comparison to Nach-
bar (2005) and keep the discussion at an informal level.
(i). The object of study. Nachbar studies repeated games and therefore
sets b i of behavior strategies for player i, that is, maps from the set of nite
histories to probability distributions over the action space. I study sets Ri of
decision rules within a context, that is, maps from an information space to
the action space. The interpretation is that a decision rule species wh
b
at a
player would do given the common information that the players receive, but
the rule also species what would have the player chosen according to that
rule if the player were to receive information that is di¤erent from the one
the player actually receives.
(ii) Learnability and mutual knowledge. Nachbar takes the belief b i (withsupport given by  i) of the player i over the repeated game strategy of 
the opponent as given and assumes that b i satises learnability if for every
pair of strategies from b := b1  b2 player i (weakly) learns to predict the
path of play: I say that Rbi can lead to mutual p belief of actions (K), for a
given probability level p; if for every pair of rules r1 and r2 from R there is
information mi 2M that allows each player i to put probability of at least p
the choices made by his opponent when receiving informationmi. N
b
otice that
Nachbars learnability assumption requires learning to take place necessarily
7Which, a fortiori, are required to hold for many games if the conditions of Theorems
A or B are to hold.
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for every pair of strategies in ; whereas K requires inference merely to be a
possibility for every pair of de
b
cision rules in R.
(iii) Consistency and " rationality. Nachbar assumes  satises "  con-
sistency for every player i given beliefs i if
b
each player i has a uniform "
best response in b i. I assume Rb is consistent with " ration
b
ality given beliefs
i if for each player i there is a rule ri in Ri such that, for every information
m 2 M; choice ri(m) maximizes expected utility for player i, where the ex-
pectation is taken with respect to the be
b
liefs that follow from conditioning
i on m. Theorem 1 in Nachbar (2005) nds conditions that lead  not
to be " consistent. Theorem 1 in the present paper nds conditions that
lead Rbi not to be consistent with " rationality. Hence, the structure of
b
both
theorems regarding rationality of strategies and rules is similar. What varies
is the meaning of rationality in either case.
(iv) Strategic Uncertainty. Nachbar (2005)s belief diversity condition
(CSP) is composed of two conditions, CS (caution and symmetry) and P
(pure strategies), both related to the richness of : CS says that Si (the
set of purebehavior strategies in i) contains all pure strategies that are
simple translationsof the pure strategies in S i a
b
nd viceversa. Con 
b
dition
P says that if a behavior strategy i
b
is in i then at least one pure stragegy
that coarsely approximates i is contained in 
b
i as well.
Condition SU in the present paper is a
b
lso
b
related to the richness of R:
Condition SU is essentially like CS in Nachbars (2005) paper in that it says
that, given some translationmap  between Ai and A i, if Rbi contains r 
b
i,
then Rb i contains r i such that r i chooses  (ai) at m when ri chooses a      i
at m.
A condition like Condition P in Nachbar (2005) is not necessary in the
present paper as I only deal with puredecision rules here.
Because of the nature of SU; it is not surprising that Ri contains irrational
decision rules. What is surprising is that SU, when combined with K, makes
Rbi contain only irrational decision rules.
b
(v). Results. Nachbars main theorem is Theorem 1, a theorem that
applies to impatient players in games that satisfy a No Weak Dominance
condition and to players of any patience in games such that the pure action
maxmin payo¤ is strictly less than the minmax payo¤. Because I only deal
with one shot games, in this paper discounting is not an issue and therefore I
only need to assume that games satisfy the No Weak Dominance condition.
It is a very weak condition.
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(vi). Interpretation. Nachbar (2005) is quite careful in pointing out that
his research does not imply that learning cannot lead to Nash equilibrium.
What his research reveals is that learning will come at the cost of beliefs
either being inconsistent with rationality or else certain kinds of uncertainty
being ruled out at the outset. I interpret the research in the present paper
in exactly the same way: one can nd epistemic models with conditions
that lead to Nash equilibrium, but if the beliefs in those models are to be
consistent with rationality of decision rules, as dened in this paper, then
they have to rule out, ex ante, certain types of strategic uncertainty.
5.4 Other related literature
Binmore (1987) and Canning (1992) explored the consequences of modelling
rational agents by means of assuming that players use computable decision
procedures in making their choices (procedures that take the decision pro-
cedure of the opponent as given) and use the unsolvability of the halting
problem to show that there is no decision procedure that leads to ratio-
nal choices against all possible decision procedures of the opponent for all
games. The results presented in this paper have a similar avor, except that
they do not hinge on computability assumptions. Another di¤erence is that,
contrary to Binmore (1987) and Canning (1992), I also present the results
in the language of interactive epistemology, that is, in the context of state
space models where each state contains information about payo¤ relevant
variables, as well as about the knowledge and belief by each player about
each others knowledge and beliefs.
A typical reaction to results such as those by Binmore (1987) and Can-
ning (1992) is that they are of limited interest due to the computability
assumptions made in those papers. It is argued that real decision makers
would be more sophisticated that the algorithms considered by Binmore and
Canning allow and that their negative results on the impossibility of players
rationally understanding each other in equilibrium were not very relevant.
The research presented in the present paper shows that the problems they
identied are intrinsically game theoretic,8 can be discussed even if one ab-
stracts from computability issues and can be readily compared with what is
known about the epistemic conditions that lead to equilibrium in state space
8As the impossibility result in Brandenburger and Keisker (2006) is also eminently
game theoretic.
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models.
6 Appendix: The proof of Lemma 2
Dene wi(ai) := max gi (a0i; a~ i (ai))   gi (ai; a~ i (ai)) ; wi := min w
ai
0 A
    i (ai) ;2 i ai2Ai
and " := min fw1; w2g : Note that wi(ai)  0 with strict inequality when ai
is not weakly dominant. Let wi := min wi (ai) > 0; gi := max gi (a) and
ai2Ai a2A
gi := min gi (a) : No strategy is weakly dominant, so gi g > 0:ia2A
 
For the moment x p 2 (0; 1) and " > 0: Pick an
h
arbitra
i
ry r1 2 R1 and
let re2 be an evil twin of r1, namely, r2 = a2 (r1 (m)) for all m 2M . As in the
hypothesis of the Lemma, assume t
e
hat 
e
a
1 (re2 (m) ;m)  p for some m 2 M:
Let a1 = r1 (m) and a

2 = r2 (m) for such m.
Given such beliefs, play
e
er 1s expected payo¤ from choosing a1 is at most
p  g1(a1; a2) + (1  p) g1:
If player 1s choice a1 is a best response to the players beliefs her expected
payo¤ from choosing a1 would be at least
p  max g1(a1; a2) + (1  p) g :
a 2 11 A1
Therefore, " rationality of r1 requires that
"+ p  g1(a1; a2) + (1  p) g1  p  max g1(a1; a2) + (1  p) g ;1a12A1
or
"+ (1  p)
h
g1   g
i
 p

max g1(a1; a

2) (
a12A1
  g1 a1; a2)1

but a2 = ea2 (a1) ; so max g1(a1; a2) g1(a1; a2) = w1 (a1) w1: Therefore,
a12A1
  
"+ (1  p)
h
g1   g1
i
 pw1;
[ ]which cannot hold, for example, for " < w1 and
+ g
p i
 g
> i : This guar-
wi+[gi g ]
antees the existence of the desired " and p which means, in
i
the end, that
for su¢ ciently low " and su¢ ciently high p the rule r1is not an " rational
decision rule for player 1. 
22
References
[1] Aumann, R. and A. Brandenburger, Epistemic Conditions for Nash
Equilibrium, Econometrica 63, 1161-1180, 1995.
[2] Binmore, K., Modelling Rational Players, Part I,Economics and Phi-
losophy 3, 179-214, 1987.
[3] Bonanno, G., and P. Battigalli, Recent results on belief, knowledge and
the epistemic foundations of game theory, Research in Economics 53,
149-225, 1999.
[4] Brandenburger, A., Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games,Journal of
Economic Perspectives 6, 83-101, 1992.
[5] Brandenburger, A., The Power of Paradox: Some Recent Developments
in Interactive Epistemology, International Journal of Game Theory,
forthcoming, 2006.
[6] Brandenburger, A. and J. Keisler, An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs
in Games, Studia Logica, forthcoming, 2006.
[7] Camerer, C., T. Ho, and J. Chong, A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of
Games,Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 861-898, 2004.
[8] Canning, D., Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium,
Econometrica 60, 877-888, 1992.
[9] Costa-Gomes, M. and V. Crawford, Cognition and Behavior in Two-
Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,American Economic
Review, forthcoming, 2006.
[10] Costa-Gomes, M., V. Crawford and B. Broseta, Cognition and Be-
havior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study,University of
California, San Diego, Discussion Paper Series: DP 98-22, 1998.
[11] Costa-Gomes, M., V. Crawford and B. Broseta, Cognition and Behav-
ior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study,Econometrica 69,
1193-1235, 2001.
[12] Costa-Gomes, M. and G. Weizsäcker, Stated Beliefs and Play in
Normal-Form Games,Unpublished Paper, 2005.
23
[13] Dekel, E. and F. Gul, Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory,in
Kreps, D. and K.Wallis (eds.), Advances in economics and econometrics:
Theory and Applications, vol. I, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[14] Ho, T., C. Camerer and K. Weigelt, Iterated Dominance and Iterated
Best Response in Experimental p-Beauty Contests,American Eco-
nomic Review 88, 947-969, 1998.
[15] Myerson, R., Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory,
Journal of Economic Literature XXXVII, 1067-1082, 1999.
[16] Nachbar, J., Prediction, Optimization, and Learning in Repeated
Games," Econometrica 65, 275-309, 1997.
[17] Nachbar, J., Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games of Incomplete In-
formation,Social Choice and Welfare 18, 303-326, 2001.
[18] Nachbar, J.,Beliefs in Repeated Games, Econometrica 73, 459-480,
2005.
[19] Nagel, R., Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study.
American Economic Review 85, 1313-1326, 1995.
[20] Samuelson, L, Modeling Knowledge in Economic Analysis,Journal of
Economic Literature XLII, 367-403, 2004.
[21] Stahl, D. and P. Wilson, Experimental Evidence on PlayersModels
of Other Players." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 25,
309-327,1994.
[22] Stahl, D. and P. Wilson, On PlayersModels of Other Players: Theory
and Experimental Evidence,Games and Economic Behavior 10, 218-
254, 1995.
24
